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Abstract
Public systems of higher education have recently attempted to cut costs by pro-
viding ￿nancial incentives to institutions who reduce the diversity of their programs.
We study the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of reducing product diversity in higher educa-
tion, against the background of a funding system reform in Flanders (Belgium). We
￿nd that dropping duplicated programs at individual institutions tends to be socially
undesirable, due to the limited ￿xed cost and variable cost savings and the students￿
low willingness to travel to other institutions. Furthermore, we ￿nd that the ￿nancial
incentives o⁄ered to drop programs may be very ine⁄ective, leading to both undesirable
reform and undesirable status quo. These ￿ndings emphasize the complexities in regu-
lating product diversity in higher education, and serve as a word of caution towards the
various decentralized ￿nancial incentive schemes that have recently been introduced.
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The publicly ￿nanced systems of higher education in Europe have recently come under in-
creased scrutiny to increase their e¢ ciency (European Commission, 2006; Nadeau & McNi-
coll, 2006). Most European governments still show a reluctance to raise private contributions
through tuition fees. They have instead taken various measures to reduce product diversity,
i.e. to reduce the wide duplication of study programs across a large number of campuses. In
particular, universities have been encouraged to merge or form associations, and new public
funding systems have been designed to provide ￿nancial incentives to institutions to drop
some of their study programs. These policies are based on a common belief that a reduced
product diversity saves on the (duplicated) ￿xed costs, without generating too large losses
to consumers (students).
This paper considers the e⁄ects of reducing product diversity in higher education, against
the background of a recently proposed funding system reform in Flanders (Belgium). Accord-
ing to the 2005 proposals, institutions would receive public funding based on their achieved
concentration index, i.e. the average number of students per study program. This therefore
provides ￿nancial incentives to eliminate the smaller programs. We address two main ques-
tions. First, does reducing product diversity make sense from a welfare perspective? Second,
does the concentration index provide the proper incentives to cut the right programs, i.e. if
and only if this is socially desirable?
To address these questions we estimate a model of undergraduate educational choice,
accounting for the determinants of the students￿decisions where and what to study. The
welfare e⁄ects from cutting programs consist of consumer surplus losses, variable cost savings
(or losses) due to an output reallocation e⁄ect, and ￿xed cost savings. The pro￿t e⁄ects
consist of tuition fee revenue losses, ￿xed cost savings, and the incentive provided by the
concentration index funding system.
Our ￿rst main ￿nding is that the social desirability of cutting programs at individual
institutions is limited to less than 10% of the cases. This follows from the students￿low
willingness to travel to other institutions. Reducing product diversity therefore results in large
consumer surplus losses that typically outweigh any possible variable or ￿xed cost savings.
Our second main ￿nding is that a funding system that would make use of a concentration
index may be very ine⁄ective and often misses its purpose. It frequently creates incentives to
cut programs when this would actually be socially undesirable. Furthermore, for the minority
of cases where program cuts are actually desirable, the system may often not provide the
proper incentives to do so. These ￿ndings of undesirable reform and undesirable status quo
emphasize the complexities in regulating product diversity in publicly ￿nanced systems of
1higher education, and serve as a word of caution towards the various other measures that
have recently been proposed. Policy makers often appear to be too pre-occupied with the
￿xed cost savings following program cuts: these may be too limited when traded o⁄ against
the implied consumer surplus losses.
Our paper relates to the empirical industrial organization literature on product diver-
sity. Several studies have estimated demand models to measure the e⁄ects of new product
introductions or eliminations. They typically focus on consumer surplus and gross producer
surplus e⁄ects, i.e. excluding the di¢ cult to observe ￿xed costs.1 A few studies have ac-
counted for the role of ￿xed costs, by adding an entry model to the demand side. In particular,
Berry and Waldfogel (1999) infer ￿xed costs from a model of free entry, where entry occurs if
and only if this is pro￿table.2 This approach is not possible in our application, since the deci-
sion to supply study programs is subject to an untransparant government approval process.
We therefore make the weaker assumption that institutions o⁄er programs if (but not only
if) this is pro￿table. This provides simple upper bounds on the ￿xed costs per program,
and actually brings us quite far in drawing unambiguous conclusions about the total welfare
e⁄ects and pro￿t incentives of reducing product diversity. Similar approaches may therefore
be useful in other applications where there is no simple free entry process.
In the educational economics literature there has been a long-standing concern with the
e¢ cient use of resources.3 Several papers identi￿ed the importance of scale economies in the
provision of education, thereby providing arguments in favour of reducing product variety.4
However, the demand side of higher education remains underexplored. A notable exception is
Long￿ s (2004) thorough analysis of the determinants of higher educational choice in the U.S.,
including the role of distance and college characteristics. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006)
extend her approach to study the choice determinants at the more detailed level of the study
￿elds. Both papers do not, however, draw implications about reducing product diversity, an
issue that is especially relevant in the regulated European systems. To accomplish this, we
estimate a rich model of student choices at the most disaggregated level of the individual
study program.
1Petrin (2002), Hausman and Leonard (2002) and Nevo (2003) look at the consumer e⁄ects of new product
introduction. Perlo⁄ and Ward (2003) also look at product eliminations and consider both consumer surplus
and gross pro￿ts, using assumptions about pricing behavior.
2For the large theoretical literature on free entry and optimal product diversity, see for example Spence
(1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
3For example, Bergstrom et al. (1988) devised an empirical test to determine whether governments spend
too much on public education.
4Riew (1966) and Cohn et al. (1989) found evidence of scale economies at the secondary school and
higher education level, respectively. These ￿ndings suggest that education institutions could reduce their
unit costs of operation by growing relative to their current size.
2The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant
institutional aspects of the higher education system in Flanders (Belgium), in particular the
current product diversity and the proposed funding system reform. Section 3 outlines the
economic framework to analyze the e⁄ects of reducing product diversity. Section 4 presents
the empirical model of educational choice and the empirical estimates. Section 5 uses the
framework and empirical results to assess the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Higher education in the region of Flanders
Our empirical analysis is based on Flanders (Belgium), but it is also relevant for several
other European countries. We focus our discussion on the current product diversity and on
the recent government policies aimed at reducing it. For a more detailed discussion of higher
education in Flanders, we refer to Van He⁄en and Lub￿ s (2003) country report.
2.1 Institutions and study programs
There are two types of institutions o⁄ering higher education: colleges and universities. Col-
leges largely focus on teaching and o⁄er one-cycle or two-cycle vocational study programs.
Universities are active in both research and teaching and o⁄er two-cycle academic programs.
In recent years, there has been a convergence between the two-cycle vocational programs at
colleges and their academic counterparts at universities. Several institutions have multiple
campuses across the region.
There are ten main study ￿elds: architecture, engineering, sciences, economics & business,
education sciences, other social sciences, medicine & paramedics, bio-engineering, languages
and cultural studies. These ￿elds apply to both colleges and universities, except for sciences
which are only o⁄ered at universities. Each ￿eld may consist of more than one ￿elemental￿
study program. For example, hotel management and marketing are study programs in the
vocational economics & business ￿eld, while dentistry and medical sciences are programs in
the academic medicine/paramedics ￿eld.
Table 1 provides an overview of product diversity in the academic year 2001-2002. The
table shows the number of campuses, study programs, incoming students, and the average
number of students per study program. The information is summarized for each of the ten
study ￿elds at colleges (upper panel) and universities (lower panel). Table 1 shows that
there are 44 college campuses and 9 university campuses, amounting to a high density of
one campus per 250 km2. All ￿elds are broadly available at many campuses throughout
3the region. This ￿duplication￿of supply is especially large for vocational study ￿elds at
colleges, in particular for engineering, economics & business, education sciences and medicine
& paramedics. The average scale per study program is relatively low, most notably for
programs within the cultural studies ￿eld at colleges (where there are only 19 incoming
students per program).
In sum, Table 1 illustrates the high product diversity in the market for higher education
in Flanders. There is a broad geographical coverage of all study ￿elds, and a correspondingly
small average scale, especially at college campuses. These observations will be useful when
interpreting and evaluating the e⁄ects of the government policy towards the large product
diversity.
2.2 Government intervention and the 2005 reform proposals
As in most European countries the Flemish undergraduate higher education system is en-
tirely public. The government intervenes in several ways. First, it regulates tuition fees,
which are currently uniform at e 425 for colleges and e 445 for universities. Second, the
government exercises some direct control over the quality and the diversity of supply. The
quality is controlled through a system of self-assessments and external visiting committees.
The diversity is regulated since institutions are not automatically eligible to o⁄er all pos-
sible study programs. In practice, however, the institutions form a continuous pressure to
be entitled to supply additional subsidized programs. Third, the government intervenes by
granting subsidies. In the former funding system the subsidies consisted of a ￿xed and a
variable component. The variable component represented a constant subsidy per student,
varying across study programs on cost-based principles.
The 2005 reform proposals aimed to make the funding system more e¢ cient. The constant
subsidy per student has been made in line with recent and more accurate estimates of the
variable cost per student, as obtained by Deen et al. (2005). Since the subsidies will be used
as a measure for the variable costs in our analysis below, Table 2 summarizes the information
for the ten di⁄erent study ￿elds (i.e. averaged over the individual study programs within
each ￿eld). The subsidies tend to be lower for colleges than for universities, and show a wide
variation across ￿elds: the lowest levels are for humanities and social sciences and the highest
levels for medical and exact sciences. These di⁄erences in subsidies per student clearly re￿ ect
the di⁄erences in the estimated variable costs per student.
The more crucial 2005 reform proposals, and the focus of our analysis, consisted of a
series of ￿nancial incentives to induce institutions to limit the number of institutions and
study programs. These incentives served as an alternative to the former approach which had
4unsuccessfully attempted to limit product diversity through direct regulation. First, institu-
tions were required to reach a minimum size to be eligible for funding. Furthermore, ￿nancial
bonuses through phase-out funding were provided for programs that an institution decided
to cut and institutions could earn additional funding by jointly o⁄ering study programs. A
￿nal incentive proposed to reduce product diversity was the replacement of the ￿xed funding
component by a variable scheme based on the institution￿ s achieved concentration index.






where Qk is the total number of students and Jk is the total number of study programs at
institution k. An institution would then receive a subsidy amount r per unit of the achieved
concentration index.5 We will refer to this system as the CI funding system. It provides
an incentive to reduce the number of programs Jk, though at the risk that the number of
students Qk also goes down.
In the next section we provide a framework to analyze the incentives to cut programs
taking into account the students￿demand responses. We also will provide conditions under
which reducing product diversity is desirable from a welfare perspective. We note, however,
that the 2005 proposed CI funding system was not actually incorporated in the 2007 reforms
for practical reasons.6 Nevertheless, our analysis emphasizes the key importance of properly
accounting for students￿demand responses, and is therefore also relevant for other ￿nancial
incentive schemes designed to reduce product diversity (such as the ￿nancial bonuses to
eliminate or merge study options).
3 Economic framework
We now provide the economic framework for analyzing the demand, pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects
of reducing product diversity in higher education. This will serve as the basis for our empirical
analysis in the next sections.
5In practice, the index is slightly more complicated (Vandenbroucke, 2005). It is normalized by the average
index over all institutions. This normalized concentration index has to stay within bounds of 0:5 and 1:5.
We account for this in our empirical analysis, but not in our discussion since it complicates the exposition
and it only matters for a minority of the institutions. The lower bound is obtained for 5 and the upper bound
for 4 out of the 53 institutions. The subsidy r per 0.01 units of the (normalized) concentration index was
set at e 16,000.
6For example, it was argued by universities that it is common to pool students and ￿ share￿them across
study programs so that critical mass is achieved whilst the concentration index is not able to capture such
initiatives.
53.1 Demand, pro￿ts and welfare
There are K institutions; each institution k = 1￿￿￿K o⁄ers Jk study programs, j = 1￿￿￿Jk,
so the total number of study alternatives is J =
PK
k=1 Jk. There are I students, i = 1￿￿￿I,
each making the discrete choice of one among the J available study alternatives.7 The
discrete choice model is speci￿ed in section 4.1. The implied number of students or aggregate
demand for program j at institution k is denoted by qjk(p), where p denotes the J ￿ 1
price vector p of all study alternatives (programs and institutions). The total demand of
institution k is the sum of all its program demands, i.e. Qk(p) =
PJk
j=1 qjk(p). Since all
students choose one of the available study alternative, total demand across all institutions




j=1 qjk(p) = I.
The program-related pro￿ts of institution k consist of tuition fee revenues and subsidies
minus variable and ￿xed costs over all its programs.8 Each program j has a constant variable
cost per student cj (common across institutions k) and a ￿xed cost Fjk. The subsidies consist
of two parts. First, there is a constant and program-speci￿c variable subsidy per student sj,
which is cost-based so that sj = cj. Second, there is an additional subsidy at the level of the
institution k. As discussed in section 2, the 2005 reform proposals replaced the traditional
￿xed subsidy by the CI funding system, i.e. a subsidy r per unit of institution k￿ s achieved
concentration index Ck(p). This index is equal to the institution￿ s average program size, i.e.




















or simply the tuition fee revenues plus the revenues from the achieved concentration index
minus the ￿xed costs.
Producer surplus is the sum of all institutions￿program-related pro￿ts minus government
subsidies. The subsidies cancel out since they are simply transfers from the government to
7There is thus no outside good. This is consistent with our earlier work with study options at the more
aggregate ￿eld level (Kelchtermans and Verboven, 2006), where we found very limited substitution to the
outside good in response to cost increases.
8Institutions may also obtain other bene￿ts, such as bene￿ts from research or from raising the students￿
productivity (as modeled by Del Rey, 2001), or ￿prestige￿(De Fraja and Iossa, 2001). While we do not rule
out the presence of such objectives, we assume them to be separable from the direct program-related pro￿ts.













where cj is observed since we observe sj = cj.
Consumer surplus at a given price vector p is the sum of each student i￿ s individual
consumer surplus, CS(p) =
PI
i=1 CSi(p). Total welfare is the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, W(p) = CS(p) + PS(p).
3.2 The e⁄ects of reducing product diversity
It is convenient to de￿ne the elimination of study alternatives (i.e. programs and/or insti-
tutions) in terms of prohibitive tuition fee increases. The initial price vector p0 consists of
uniform tuition fees p0 for all study alternatives. After the elimination of one or more study
alternatives there is a new price vector p1, where the prices for the eliminated alternatives
are replaced by in￿nitely high prices (so that their demands e⁄ectively become zero). We
focus the exposition here on the unilateral elimination of one program j at one institution
k, and denote this new price vector by p1
jk (with the price for program j at institution k
set equal to in￿nity and the other prices remaining at the initial level p0). In our empirical
analysis, we will also consider the joint elimination of one study program j at all institutions,
as denoted by a price vector p1
j (with in￿nite prices for program j at all institutions).
Demand e⁄ects First, consider the e⁄ects of a unilateral cut of program j at institution
k on the total demand (number of students) of institution k. A common measure is the











This ratio is between zero and one, and measures the fraction of the students lost from the
eliminated program j that ￿ ows back to other programs o⁄ered by the same institution k.9 A
high diversion ratio means that students have a strong preference for the institution rather
than for the speci￿c program. This may re￿ ect high mobility costs, but also simply the
9The diversion ratio is often used in merger analysis (e.g. Shapiro, 1995), where it refers to the fraction
of sales lost by brand A (due to a price increase) that is captured by brand B, as a ￿rst indicator of the
competitive e⁄ects of a merger of brands A and B. It also frequently appears in the theory of access price
regulation, where it is known as the displacement ratio.
7possibility that students perceive di⁄erent study programs at the same institution as close
substitutes.
Pro￿t incentives Now consider the pro￿t incentives for eliminating program j at insti-
tution k. After some rearrangements one can verify that the change in pro￿ts from such a






















According to (1), the pro￿t incentive from a diversity reduction consists of three terms. The
￿rst term is the tuition fee revenue loss, and is clearly negative. The loss is smaller than
the initial fee revenues from the eliminated alternative p0qjk(p0), since it accounts for the
fact that some of the lost students may remain within the same institution (DRjk > 0).
The third term is positive and refers to the ￿xed cost savings associated with eliminating
study program j. The second term captures the change in the concentration index, and may
be positive or negative. One can easily verify that the concentration index increases, i.e.
Ck(p1






Hence, the CI funding scheme provides a positive pro￿t incentive for eliminating program j
at institution k if it has a su¢ ciently low number of students. When DRjk = 0, it provides
a positive incentive if the number of students at program j is below the institution￿ s average
program size (qjk(p0) < Ck(p0)). When DRjk > 0, some of the lost students substitute to
other programs within the institution, so that the system may provide a positive pro￿t incen-
tive to cut a program even if the number of students is above average. The general message
is that the CI funding system creates positive incentives to drop programs with few students
and with su¢ cient substitution possibilities to other programs within the institution.
Welfare e⁄ects Finally, consider the welfare e⁄ects of a unilateral cut of program j at





which is clearly negative since the program drop involves a (prohibitive) tuition fee increase
for the eliminated program. Note that one can interpret ￿￿CSjk as the students￿net
8willingness to pay for program j at institution k, i.e. the students￿willingness to pay on top







































where the second equality follows from the fact that total demand is inelastic. The ￿rst term
is the variable cost saving from an output reallocation e⁄ect following the program drop. It
may be positive or negative depending on whether the other programs to which the students
substitute have a lower or a higher variable cost than the eliminated program. The second
term is a positive ￿xed cost saving.
The e⁄ect of a program cut on total welfare then consists of the following components:
























Eliminating program j thus involves a negative e⁄ect on consumers, a positive or negative
variable cost saving from output reallocation, and a positive ￿xed cost saving.
3.3 Inferences without observing ￿xed costs
A comparison of (1) and (2) clearly shows that the pro￿t incentives and welfare e⁄ects
of a program cut are not necessarily well-alligned. Our empirical analysis aims to assess
this, but faces the following main challenge. While we can measure most pro￿t and welfare
components from our demand parameter estimates and our variable cost proxy cj = sj, we
do not observe the ￿xed cost savings involved in a program cut. We therefore proceed as
follows.
￿ In a ￿rst step, we focus on the observable components of the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects,
i.e. tuition fee revenue losses, the change in the concentration index, consumer losses,
and the output reallocation e⁄ect. This is in the spirit of other work on the e⁄ects of
product diversity, such as Petrin (2002), Hausman and Leonard (2002) or Nevo (2003),
which all abstracted from ￿xed cost considerations.
10In the empirical analysis we will compare this with the willingness to pay for program j across all
institutions (by considering the new price vector p1
j).
9￿ In the second step, we obtain reasonable bounds on the ￿xed cost savings, and thereby
at least provide su¢ cient conditions under which unilateral program cuts raise or lower
total pro￿ts or welfare. It turns out that, in our application, this approach gives us
conclusive answers on the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of the CI funding system for a large
number of cases.
More speci￿cally, in the second step we make the following assumptions about the ￿xed
costs of any program j at any institution k. First, we assume that ￿xed costs are positive, i.e.
Fjk > 0 for all j;k. Second, we assume that institutions did not ￿nd it pro￿table to cut any
of the o⁄ered programs under the old funding system, where the concentration index was not
yet at work.11 Inspecting (1), but without the term for the change in the concentration index,
this amounts to an upper bound on ￿xed costs of Fjk < (1 ￿ DRjk)p0qjk(p0). Intuitively,
the ￿xed costs at any program j at any institution k are assumed to be less than the tuition
fee revenue losses that would result from a program cut in the old funding system. These
revenue losses are simply the actual revenues p0qjk(p0), adjusted for the estimated diversion
ratio.
In sum, we thus bound the ￿xed costs of program j at institution k between two levels:
0 < Fjk < (1 ￿ DRjk)p
0qjk(p
0): (3)
Note that as the diversion ratio increases (becomes closer to 1), the upper bound on the
￿xed cost becomes tighter.
We can now combine the ￿xed cost bounds (3) with (1) and (2) to obtain the following
su¢ cient conditions for the sign of the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of unilateral program cuts:
Proposition 1 Consider a unilateral cut of program j at institution k.










> 0, and undesirable
























11This is in the spirit of the empirical IO literature on entry. From observing a certain program we can
infer that it is pro￿table to supply it, implying an upper bound on the ￿xed cost level. The empirical IO
literature on free entry would however go a step further. Under free entry, one could also infer that supplying
additional programs would be unpro￿table, implying a lower bound on ￿xed costs. This inference is not
reasonable in our setting, since the entry of additional programs is regulated, implying that institutions
cannot simple add more programs to their portfolio as long as that is pro￿table. We therefore set the lower
bound on ￿xed costs to zero.
10We will provide intuition for these inequalities at the beginning of Section 5.2 where we
apply Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 implies that the e⁄ects of the CI funding system can be classi￿ed in four
natural cases, summarized in Table 3. The top left cell shows the ￿desirable status quo￿cases,
under which a unilateral program cut is neither pro￿table nor socially desirable. The top right
cell shows the ￿undesirable status quo￿cases, under which a program cut is not pro￿table
under the CI funding system although it would be socially desirable. The bottom left cell
shows the ￿undesirable reform￿cases, under which a program cut is pro￿table although it
is not socially desirable. Finally, the bottom right cell shows the ￿desirable reform￿cases,
where a program cut is both pro￿table and socially desirable. Our empirical analysis will
show that it is possible to unambiguously classify many of the unilateral program cuts into
one these categories, even without observing the actual ￿xed cost savings Fjk.
4 Empirical framework
To estimate the e⁄ects of reducing product diversity, it is necessary to understand how
students make their educational decisions. We have a rich data set of 36;602 students
choosing one out of 562 study alternatives (programs/institutions). We specify the students￿
choice process based on a conditional logit model. This model is well-suited to deal with
the large data set, since the parameters can be consistently estimated by sampling over the
large number of study alternatives. This is considerably more e¢ cient than sampling over
the individuals.12
Our logit model does not include an outside good or ￿no-study alternative￿ . In a pre-
vious paper Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) included an outside good in a nested logit
framework (with study options aggregated to the ￿eld level). Since we found that students
are extremely cost inelastic regarding the decision whether to study, we chose to adopt the
computationally simpler logit model without an outside good here. Hence, we focus ex-
clusively on the decision where and what to study. This is especially convenient since we
12Sampling over alternatives in non-logit discrete choie models does not generally give consistent maximum
likelihood estimates. Bierlaire et al. (2006) show that it is still possible to obtain consistent maximum
likelihood estimates in ￿block additive generalized extreme value models￿ , which includes the logit but not
the nested logit model. Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) show how to sample over alternatives in a nested
logit model using a sequential procedure. Most recently, Fox (2007) has proposed a maximum score estimator
to obtain consistent estimates based on a subset of alternatives for a general class of discrete choice models
including random coe¢ cients (or mixed) logit models. However, given the richness of our data set, the
need for controlling for additional unobserved student heterogeneity appears to be lower here than in other
applications.
11analyze the study alternatives at a considerably more disaggregate level than Kelchtermans
and Verboven (2006).
4.1 Indirect utility
A student i￿ s conditional indirect utility for study program j at institution k consists of a
deterministic component Vijk and a random component "ijk. The deterministic component
Vijk depends on the expected bene￿ts from studying and on the expected costs, including
the monetary costs in the form of tuition fees and travel costs. We take the following
speci￿cation:




i￿(yi ￿ pjk ￿ g(xik)); (4)
where wi is a vector of individual characteristics (sex, age, high school background, etc.), yi
is student i￿s annual income, pjk is the tuition fee for study program j at institution k, and
g(xik) is an implicit price because of the annual travel costs xik of student i to institution k.
The ￿rst two terms in (4) may in principle include a full set of alternative-speci￿c inter-
cepts ￿jk and slope vectors ￿jk. In practice, such ￿ exibility would imply a very large number
of parameters to be estimated, because of the large number of alternatives to be interacted
with the individual characteristics in the vector wi. We will therefore specify ￿jk and ￿jk to
depend on a more limited but still rich set of alternative characteristics (e.g. program type
or ￿eld, institution￿ s religious a¢ liation, etc.)
The third term in (4) refers to the utility from the consumption on goods other than the
study alternative, after spending the tuition fee pjk and an implicit price g(xik), which is an
increasing function of the annual travel costs xik of student i to institution k. The parameter
vector ￿ captures the determinants of the marginal utility of income and is important to
convert utility in monetary terms and conduct our welfare analysis. Each student either
commutes or goes on residence. If she commutes, her implicit price for alternative j is
simply the annual travel cost g(xik) = xik. If she goes on residence, she saves a fraction ￿
of the trips, but pays an extra annual cost on rent rk, so that her implicit price becomes
g(xik) = (1 ￿ ￿)xik + rk. A cost-minimizing student thus commutes if and only if she is
located su¢ ciently closely to institution k, i.e. ￿xik ￿ rk. The deterministic component of
utility (4) can then be written as:




i￿(yi ￿ pjk ￿ xik) + w
0
i￿(￿xik ￿ rk)I(￿xik ￿ rk); (5)
where I(￿) is an indicator function equal to 1 if its argument is positive, and equal to 0
otherwise. Utility therefore decreases in the annual travel costs xik in a piecewise linear way:
at a steeper rate w0
i￿ for low values of xik (when the student commutes), and at a ￿ atter
rate w0
i￿￿ for high values of xik (when the student goes on residence).
124.2 Estimation and data set
Each student i chooses the study program j at institution k that maximizes random utility
Vijk + "ijk, where "ijk takes the logit extreme value distribution. This results in the familiar
logit choice probabilities for each student i for each progam j at institution k. It also gives
the standard expressions for expected consumer surplus for each student i; see for example
Train (2003) for details.
The choice probabilities can be used to construct the likelihood function. There are,
however, practical di¢ culties due to the very large size of our data set:
￿ 36;602 students, i.e. all incoming students in Flanders in 2001;
￿ 562 study alternatives, i.e. the various programs o⁄ered across 53 campuses;
￿ a large set of study characteristics, interacted with many student characteristics.
The logit model is well-suited to manage this data set, as it enables consistent maximum
likelihood estimation by sampling over the study alternatives. This is considerably more
e¢ cient than sampling over individuals, in particular to identify the utility determinants of
the infrequently chosen alternatives. Speci￿cally, for each student we sample a choice set of
20 alternatives, including the chosen alternative plus a random sample of 19 other study
alternatives.13
Our data set comes from the Flemish Ministry of Education, and has information on:
Student characteristics (wi). This consists of demographic information, i.e. sex, na-
tionality and religious a¢ liation of the high school; and information on scholastic ability, i.e.
years of repetition in high school, the type of high school (general, technical or professional)
and the study program followed at high school (e.g. mathematics, languages).
Travel costs (xik). From information on students￿and institutions￿locations, we compute
the distance per trip dik (in km) and the travel time per trip tik (in min) for every student i to
every institution k. We then set the annual travel costs xik (in Euro) to xik = 75dik+40tik.14
13Furthermore, since we do not exploit observable variation across the study programs (e.g. nursing) within
a study ￿eld/type (e.g. biomedical vocational), we can aggregate the 562 elemental program/institution
alternatives to 226 ￿eld/type/institution alternatives. As shown in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), in the
logit model this simply requires including the log of the number of elemental program alternatives within
each aggregate ￿eld alternative as an additional variable in the utility speci￿cation.
14This assumes that a commuter engages in 10 trips per week during 30 weeks of the year, at a transporta-
tion cost of 0.25 Euro/km and an opportunity cost of time of 8 Euro/hour. The latter amount corresponds
to the typical wage for student jobs.
13Study alternative characteristics (entering ￿jk and ￿jk). This consists of the follow-
ing variables: the institution￿ s religious orientation, the study program type (one-cycle and
two-cycle vocational programs at colleges, and two-cycle academic programs at universities)
and the ten study ￿elds discussed in section 2 (architecture, engineering, etc.).
Following the utility speci￿cation (5), we interact the student characteristics (wi) with
both the travel costs (xik) and the study alternative characteristics (in ￿jk). Table 4 provides
summary statistics on the student characteristics and travel costs (rows), by a few main study
characteristics (columns).
4.3 Parameter estimates
We now brie￿ y discuss the parameter estimates of the logit model, as shown in Tables 5,
6a and 6b. It is however possible to directly move to section 5.1 where we show what these
estimates imply for the demand, pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of reducing product diversity.
Table 5 gives a general overview of the estimated speci￿cation and highlights the role
of travel costs in the study choice process (w0
i￿ and ￿). Travel costs have a negative and
highly signi￿cant e⁄ect on utility, but there are di⁄erences across individuals. For example,
students from a catholic high school or with a classical languages background are less cost
sensitive and consequently travel further. In contrast, students with several repetitions at
high school or with a technical (non-product focused) high school background are more cost
sensitive and therefore study more nearby their homes. Furthermore, the parameter ￿ = 0:49
shows that the e⁄ect of travel costs decreases signi￿cantly in distance: more distant students
go on residence and save 49% on the travel costs. Finally, Table 5 shows that the size
factor parameter is close to 1, indicating that the study programs within a program ￿eld are
relatively heterogeneous.
Tables 6a and 6b show how individuals value the various characteristics of the study
alternatives (w0
i￿jk).15 The ￿rst column of Table 6a shows the preferences for catholic insti-
tutions. Most notably, students from a catholic high school tend to value catholic colleges
and universities higher than other students, suggesting the continuing strong links between
the catholic high school and higher education networks. The second and third columns of
Table 6a show the impact of nationality and the speci￿c high school background on the
utility for academic or two-cycle vocational programs (with one-cycle vocational programs
as the base). For example, foreign students tend to prefer the academic and two-cycle voca-
15These results extend Kelchtermans and Verboven (2006) by (1) considering more detailed study ￿elds
(Table 6a), and (2) adding richer interaction terms between the study ￿elds/types and the student charac-
teristics (Table 6b). Nevertheless, several parameters are imposed to zero because of a too low number of
observations on some of the interactions.
14tional programs over the one-cycle vocational programs. This is also true for students with
a general high school background in classical languages and/or mathematics. The remaining
columns of Table 6a show the impact of nationality and high school background on the utility
for the speci￿c study ￿elds (cultural studies being the base category). Foreigners are more
likely to opt for engineering or economics & business. Furthermore, the speci￿c general high
school background is closely related to the valuation for the study ￿elds at higher education
institutions. For example, students with a science of mathematics general high school back-
ground have a strong preference for science or engineering programs and not for programs
in languages or culture (the base category). The reverse is true for students with a general
high school background in classical languages.
Table 6b presents the role of the other student characteristics (sex, years of repetition and
type of high school) on the study ￿elds, broken down by the program type (one-cycle and
two-cycle vocational, and academic). For example, male students have a higher preference for
engineering and economics & business programs, regardless of the type of higher education.
At the same time, they have a lower preference for medicine & paramedics but only if this is
of the one-cycle vocational type (which primarily consists of nursing programs). As another
example, students who experienced a year of repetition in high school have a lower utility
from participating in architecture and engineering but only if this is of the academic type.
Such students also prefer economics & business or medicine & paramedics of the one-cycle
vocational type, rather than of the two-cycle vocational or academic types. Students with an
intellectually more demanding general high school background tend to prefer the academic
and two-cycle program ￿elds over the counterparts of the one-cycle program ￿elds.
5 The e⁄ects of reducing product diversity
Section 5.1 discusses the demand, pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects from reducing product diversity,
without accounting for the ￿xed cost savings. Section 5.2 then considers the total pro￿t and
welfare e⁄ects, based on our obtained bounds for the ￿xed cost savings (3), enabling us to
draw policy implications regarding the CI funding system.
5.1 Demand, pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects
The demand e⁄ects from unilateral program cuts at individual institutions are best summa-
rized by the diversion ratios implied by our parameter estimates. As discussed, the diversion
ratio measures the fraction of students that go to other programs in the same institution
when a speci￿c program is eliminated. Table 7 shows the diversion ratios from unilateral
15program cuts, summarized by study ￿eld. The diversion ratios clearly tend to be higher at
universities than at colleges (average across all ￿elds of 28% versus 19%). Universities would
thus loose comparatively fewer students after unilateral program cuts. This is due to their
larger size and less competition. There are some interesting di⁄erences in the diversion ratios
between the ￿elds. For example, the diversion ratio is particularly low for language programs
at colleges (8%), indicating that students do not perceive other programs o⁄ered at the same
institution as good substitutes for languages. At the other extreme, the diversion ratio is over
30% for architecture, engineering, medicine and education sciences at universities, showing
that programs from these ￿elds have relatively good substitutes within the same university.
Table 8 shows how these substitution e⁄ects translate into two of the pro￿t components:
tuition fee revenues and revenues from the CI funding scheme, see equation (1). (The third
pro￿t component, i.e. ￿xed cost savings, is addressed in the next subsection.) For all ￿elds
the tuition fee revenues decrease in response to a program cut, but by less than the current
tuition fee revenues. This follows directly from the diversion ratios, i.e. the fact that students
may substitute to other programs within the university after a program cut. Furthermore,
the revenue changes from the concentration index based funding scheme may or may not
compensate for these tuition fee revenue losses. Program cuts from large ￿elds such as
educational sciences would result in a lower concentration index and hence create additional
revenue losses. In contrast, program cuts from the smaller ￿elds, such as bio-engineering at
colleges or sciences and medicine at universities, result in large increases in the concentration
index, generating revenue gains that actually outweigh the tuition fee revenue losses. For
those cases, the funding system provides incentives to cut programs even without any ￿xed
cost savings.
Table 9 shows the e⁄ects of unilateral program cuts on two of the welfare components:
consumer surplus and variable costs, see equation (2). (The third component is again ￿xed
costs and addressed in the next subsection.) First, the consumer surplus e⁄ects are evidently
always negative when a program is eliminated (￿rst two columns). This is especially so for
the larger programs at colleges and universities. Recall that the absolute value of these
consumer surplus e⁄ects may also be interpreted as the students￿net willingness to pay
for the eliminated program, i.e. their willingness to pay on top of the paid tuition fees.
This willingness to pay is usually quite large, for some ￿elds it is three to four times larger
than the students￿actual tuition fee expenditures (shown earlier in Table 8).16 This is due
to a low student mobility and willingness to travel to other institutions, as found in our
empirical analysis. Second, the variable cost savings from output reallocation may also
16For example, the net willingness to pay for a study program in engineering at universities is on average
e522,386, which is about 3.5 times higher than the actual tuition fee expenditures (e148,479).
16be negative (third and fourth column of Table 9). This is the case for cutting programs
with low variable costs, such as economics&business or cultural programs, which both cause
substitution towards more expensive programs. The variable cost savings may, however, also
be positive, most notably for the high variable cost programs such as science and medicine
at universities. In these cases the variable cost savings even outweigh the consumer surplus
losses so that the total gross welfare changes are positive (last two columns of Table 9).
Hence, eliminating these programs would result in a total welfare gain even without any
￿xed cost savings. Program cuts from other ￿elds, however, usually involve negative gross
welfare e⁄ects, even when variable cost savings are positive. They would therefore require
su¢ cient ￿xed cost savings for total welfare to increase. Whether this is indeed the case, will
be addressed separately in the next subsection, based on our estimated bounds on the ￿xed
cost savings.
To put this welfare discussion in perspective, Table 10 presents the analogue welfare
e⁄ects from joint program cuts, i.e. program cuts common for all institutions o⁄ering the
same program. We focus our discussion here on the consumer surplus losses (￿rst two
columns). As expected, the consumer surplus losses from joint program cuts are considerably
larger than those from the unilateral cuts in Table 9. What is more interesting, however, is
that the consumer surplus losses from the joint program cuts are disproportionally larger.
Consider, for example, engineering programs at colleges. These are available at 25 college
campuses (Table 1), but the consumer surplus loss is more than 40 times larger under a joint
program cut than under a unilateral program cut (loss of e 4,977,878 versus e 116,347 ).
This motivates our focus on unilateral program cuts which may reduce ine¢ cient duplication
of ￿xed costs across multiple campuses, rather than on joint program cuts which cause
disproportionate consumer surplus losses.
5.2 Evaluation of the funding system reform
To assess the total pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of the CI funding system, we now introduce the
￿xed cost bounds given in inequality (3). Based on these bounds, Proposition 1 showed that
the CI funding system provides no incentive to cut a program if this reduces the concentration
index, while it does provide such an incentive if the additional revenues from an increase
in the concentration index outweigh the tuition fee revenue losses. Similarly, Proposition 1
showed that a program cut is socially desirable if the sum of the consumer surplus losses and
the variable cost savings from output reallocation is positive; a program cut is undesirable
if the sum of consumer surplus losses, variable cost savings and tuition fee revenue losses
is negative. Table 3 provided the corresponding classi￿cation of program cuts in desirable
17status quo, undesirable status quo, desirable reform and undesirable reform cases.
Table 11 applies this classi￿cation. It counts how many out of the 562 possible program
cuts can be unambiguously classi￿ed into one of these four cases, using our estimated ￿xed
cost bounds and the pro￿t and welfare components of the previous subsection. We begin with
the left column. The bottom cell shows that for the large majority of cases (504 out of 562, or
about 90%) it is socially undesirable to cut programs at individual institutions. This striking
result follows from the low student mobility and the correspondingly large total willingness to
pay for programs at individual institutions. The large consumer surplus losses from program
cuts are typically not compensated by su¢ cient variable or ￿xed cost savings. The other cells
in the ￿rst column show the pro￿t incentives for these 504 undesirable program cuts. We can
unambiguously classify 136 out of the 504 programs as desirable status quo cases, i.e. the
CI funding system does rightly not give a pro￿t incentive to cut the program. However, we
can also classify 197 programs as undesirable reform cases, where the system actually does
provide the wrong pro￿t incentive to cut the program. For the remaining 171 undesirable
program cuts, we cannot draw an unambiguous conclusion about the pro￿t incentive without
further ￿xed cost information. In sum, for at least 40% (197 cases) to possibly over 70%
(197+171 cases) of the 504 cases where it is undesirable to reduce product diversity, the CI
funding system nevertheless wrongly provides an incentive to do so.
The right column of Table 11 shows that it would be socially desirable to cut programs
in a small minority of 51 cases (less than 10%). But the CI funding system actually provides
the good pro￿t incentives to do so for only 33 of these 51 cases. It fails to provide the proper
incentives for at least 1 and possibly up to 18 cases.
We can draw two policy conclusions and one methodological conclusion from this discus-
sion. First, the common view that there is too much product diversity in higher education
appears to be largely unfounded. Because of low student mobility unilateral program cuts are
typically not socially desirable, suggesting that the duplication of ￿xed costs across multiple
campuses is economically justi￿ed. Second, government policies such as the CI funding sys-
tem that aim to provide decentralized incentives to reduce product diversity may easily be
ine⁄ective. For the majority of cases (504) where reducing product diversity is not desirable,
the incentives are nevertheless often given (undesirable reform). For the minority of cases
(51) where reducing product diversity would be desirable, the proper incentives may not be
given (undesirable status quo). Third, from a methodological perspective, our approach to
bound the ￿xed costs shows that it is possible to draw unambiguous total welfare conclusions
in almost all cases (504+51=555 out of 562), even without knowing the actual level of the
realized ￿xed cost savings. Drawing unambiguous conclusions about the pro￿t incentives
is somewhat more di¢ cult in this application (139+235=374 out of 562), yet the general
18tendencies remain clear.
6 Conclusions
We have analyzed the pro￿t and welfare e⁄ects of reducing product diversity in higher edu-
cation. The background was a funding system reform proposed by the Flemish government,
where universities and colleges would obtain part of their subsidies based on their achieved
concentration index (i.e. average number of students per program). A ￿rst main lesson from
our analysis is that the social desirability of reducing product diversity is considerably more
limited than commonly thought. Social welfare increases for less than 10% of the possi-
ble program cuts, so the large majority of cuts would involve a reduction in social welfare.
While there may be ￿xed cost as well as variable cost savings from cutting the expensive
programs, these apparently do not outweigh the large consumer losses because of a relatively
low student mobility. Put di⁄erently, while there is frequent duplication of ￿xed costs be-
cause programs are available at multiple campuses, this is typically not ine¢ cient because
of the students￿limited willingness to travel to other campuses.
The second main lesson is that a funding system which gives decentralized ￿nancial
incentives to cut programs may easily be ine⁄ective. Our example of the funding system based
on the concentration index shows there tends to be a severe mismatch between the social
desirability to reduce product diversity and the actual incentives provided. The idea behind
the proposed system was to encourage institutions to cut the relatively small programs (since
this would raise the institutions￿concentration index). However, we ￿nd that for the majority
of cases where program cuts are not desirable, the system nevertheless frequently creates the
incentives to do so. Furthermore, for the small minority of cases where program cuts are
actually desirable, the proper incentives may not be given. These ￿ndings of undesirable
reform and undesirable status quo emphasize the complex task of governments in regulating
product diversity in higher education. They also serve as a word of caution towards the
various other recent initiatives that have recently been taken to reduce product diversity,
such as minimum size requirements to be eligible for funding, ￿nancial incentives to jointly
operate programs between institutions, or the promotion of mergers or associations between
institutions, etc.
Our analysis is based on a simple economic framework, illuminating the role of consumer
surplus losses, variable cost savings and ￿xed cost savings. From a methodological perspec-
tive, it shows how it is possible to reach unambiguous welfare and pro￿t conclusions by
deriving bounds on the ￿xed costs, without observing the actual ￿xed costs. At the same
time, our analysis is based on a number of assumptions. First, we do not take into account
19income e⁄ects. It is possible that some program cuts hurt low income groups more, and
this may a⁄ect the social desirability of certain program cuts. Second, we do not take into
account the social cost of public funds. If these are important, the social desirability to cut
product diversity would be higher. Third, we have looked at undergraduate education. It is
possible that the desirability for diversity reduction is greater in graduate education where
student willingness to travel may be considerably greater. Finally, we have assumed that
the private gains from higher education (consumer surplus) coincide with the social gains.
In practice, the social gains may exceed the private gains because of positive spillovers (non-
appropriability of the returns to education). To the extent that spillovers exist and apply
to all study programs, this would actually strengthen the conclusions regarding the unde-
sirability of reducing program diversity. Further theoretical and empirical work would be
interesting to further explore these issues.
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22Table 1: Supply of Higher Education in Flanders (2001)
Number of Number of Number of Students/
campuses study programs students study program
Colleges (vocational programs)
Total 44 414 25,182 61
by study ￿eld
Architecture 9 11 912 83
Engineering 25 76 4,425 58
Science 0 0 0 n/a
Economics & Business 22 105 7,853 75
Education Science 26 67 6,065 91
Other Social Sciences 13 15 1,572 105
Medicine & Paramedics 23 54 1,904 35
Bio-engineering 15 26 644 25
Languages 5 5 738 148
Cultural Studies 10 55 1,069 19
Universities (academic programs)
Total 9 148 12,299 83
by study ￿eld
Architecture 3 3 198 66
Engineering 3 3 834 278
Science 7 33 1,169 35
Economics & Business 7 12 1,700 142
Education Science 3 6 711 119
Other Social Sciences 6 19 3,701 195
Medicine & Paramedics 6 19 933 49
Bio-engineering 6 13 1,177 91
Languages 6 17 842 50
Cultural Studies 6 23 1,034 45
Own calculations based on a dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education. The ￿rst column counts the number
of campuses o⁄ering at least one study program of a given study ￿eld. The second to fourth column show averages
over all study programs of a given study ￿eld.






Economics & Business 2,333 2,921
Education Science 3,633 3,767
Other Social Sciences 3,220 2,785
Medicine & Paramedics 3,711 5,444
Bio-engineering 3,721 4,527
Languages 2,760 2,719
Cultural Studies 2,331 2,713
The base subsidy for a study program is 2,300 Euro. Weighting factors are
subsequently applied depending on the resource-intensiveness of the program
as indicated in the new funding scheme for higher education. The Table
reports student-weighted averages of subsidies over study programs per study
￿eld for colleges and universities
Table 3: Possible pro￿t incentives and welfare e⁄ects of unilateral program cuts
Welfare E⁄ect



























< 0 desirable status quo undesirable status quo







24Table 4: Summary statistics of 2001 eligible pupils
All students College University Non-catholic Catholic
Demographic (wi)
male 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.43
foreign 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
catholic high school 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.67 0.87
Scholastic ability (wi)
years of repetition 0.36 0.46 0.16 0.40 0.34
(0.95) (0.99) (0.83) (1.05) (0.87)
general high school 0.60 0.44 0.94 0.63 0.58
classical languages 0.14 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.13
modern languages 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.23 0.24
economics 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20
sciences 0.20 0.11 0.40 0.24 0.18
mathematics 0.30 0.15 0.60 0.34 0.27
technical high school 0.33 0.47 0.04 0.29 0.35
￿ product￿ -focused 0.12 0.17 0.02 0.11 0.12
Mobility (xik)
Distance (kms) by road to campus 34.71 30.96 42.38 35.73 33.90
(28.17) (25.65) (31.37) (28.19) (28.13)
Time (mins) by road to campus 30.74 28.33 35.67 32.13 29.64
(17.33) (16.2) (18.47) (17.59) (17.03)
Travel cost to campus (in e10,000) 0.38 0.35 0.46 0.40 0.37
(0.28) (0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28)
Number of observations 37,481 25,182 12,299 16,557 20,924
Standard errors for the continuous variables are in parentheses. Demographic and scholastic ability data are based
on the dataset from the Flemish Ministry of Education. Mobility statistics are based on own calculations using
postal code information.







catholic high school 0.43* (4.62)
years of repetition -0.2* (-3.33)
general high school1 0.13 (0.67)
classical languages 0.49* (4.00)




technical high school1 -1.72* (-9.69)
￿ product￿ -focused 1.38* (9.98)
Size factor 0.91* (49.63)
Slope parameters (￿j)
Catholic Institution2 included, see table 6a
Academic program3 included, see table 6a
Two-cycle Vocational program3 included, see table 6a
Study ￿eld4 included, see table 6a
Academic program x Study ￿eld5 included, see table 6b
Two-cycle Vocational program x Study ￿eld5 included, see table 6b
Fixed e⁄ects (￿j) included, see table 6a
Observations 732,040
number of individuals 36,602
number of sampled alternatives 20
Log likelihood -51,816
t-statistics in parentheses. * statistical signi￿cance at 5% level
1 base category = professional/arts secondary high school
2 base category = non-catholic study program
3 base category = one-cycle vocational study program
4 base category = cultural studies
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